The government of the Weimar Republic
ordered its foreign and economic policy, two key objectives under: 1 the shaking off of reparations and 2 the reconstruction of a powerful Reichswehr. The dispute, which point should be realized first, sat down by the generals. The following priority distribution was the general belief to reason that the "forced signature under the Versailles Treaty" not really valid, "look at and therefore reserve the right to" resume the war if the war could be recovered [1] .
The government enterprise, then the secret modernization and upgrade , a German Army, for which they received a military cooperation with the Soviet Union, which had not been involved in the Treaty of Versailles. While the German military could test undisturbed in the Russian plains their new equipment and keep their staff in the form shown, conversely from German High Command officers their Soviet counterparts in modern warfare. The extremely friendly relationship between the two armies that had arisen in the course of their cooperation and would last until the mid-thirties, was based on ideas of both governments, on occasion jointly occupy the Polish attack neighboring state and can lead to. For both countries planned for the future, the areas ceded to Poland incorporate again.
In France, there was worry over the developments in Germany, not so much because of his foreign policy machinations - of which the French first learned nothing at all - but resurgent because of his being. Compared with its allies, the French complained that neither the four-year war had weakened and the conditions of the peace agreement, the supremacy of Germany in Europe. As early as 1919 staring France "from the summit of victory down into an abyss full of dangers. What should establish it in its future security against Germany in a Europe in which there is no other wirklichen Großmächte, keine starken Verbündeten mehr gab? Das alte Gleichgewicht der Kräfte war dahin." [2]
Im Gegensatz zu seinem östlichen Nachbarn war die Situation Frankreichs "tief tragisch" [3]. Einerseits fühlte man sich als Sieger, der auf seine übermenschlichen Anstrengungen, die er im Abwehrkampf aufgeboten hatte, stolz sein konnte, andererseits am Ende seiner Kräfte, die unwiderruflich verloren und schwerlich wieder aufzustocken waren. Frankreich war zwar siegreich gewesen, aber gleichzeitig stand für die französischen Politiker fest, "daß es auf die Dauer viel schwächer war als sein besiegter Feind" [4]. Bereits 1919 war ihnen die Vorstellung unerträglich, Pull all the suffering and death of many French no obvious advantage of this tragedy can. Tragically, the ambiguity that had led to the French point of view of the war, its political arrangements paralyzed.
The logic that follows consists of impotence, usually from a sentence of irrational thoughts that crowd in such a violent change the reality that in fact the reality of it will, that can dominate the thinking again.
precisely the de facto absence of an expected future disappoint the French people to the reality as it was revealed at this time could not get anything. Da sich der politische Körper Frankreichs in doppelter Weise geschädigt fühlte, baute er Widerstände auf, die sich in Form einer eigentümlichen Logik entluden. Diese Logik besagte, "Deutschland so schwach und krank zu machen wie möglich, und auf so lange Zeit wie möglich" [5].
Damit drückte sich nicht nur das Bedürfnis nach Sicherheit aus, sondern schloss zugleich den sehnlichsten Wunsch französischer Politiker mit ein, ihr Land wieder zu einer bestimmenden europäischen Macht aufrichten zu können. Mit anderen Worten: Frankreichs Größe sollte wiederhergestellt werden. Und um dieser möglichen Wirklichkeit willen waren die Franzosen bereit, eine vernünftige Lösung ihres Problems abzulehnen und statt dessen ihren Emotionen freien Lauf zu lassen.
Mit Hilfe ihrer Verbündeten, deren anfängliche Bedenken selbst im Strom der Leidenschaften untergingen, entstand "schließlich ein Dokument, das sich selbst heute noch, in vielen Teilen wie ein Strafurteil liest" [6]. Was wäre aber die Alternative gewesen? Die einzige Möglichkeit, mit der das französische Dilemma in befriedigender Weise hätte gelöst werden können, um überhaupt einen dauerhaften europäischen Frieden zu gewährleisten, wäre "die Politik der Vereinigung mit den Deutschen" [7] gewesen. Gewiss, der Zeitpunkt derartiger Überlegungen und Entschlüsse wäre direkt nach Kriegsende verfrüht been. Among there were the fresh memories of the war, too much misunderstanding between the two collective memories, as a concession that had been approved by diplomatic means. Especially with the French was - for obvious reasons - a possible "unity with the Germans in 1919 not in the heart [8].
that the thought of a possible association with the Germans, expressed first of Clemenceau during a Senate speech in 1919, could even play a significant role in French foreign policy was primarily Aristide Briand, who took over in April 1925 as Head of Department due. His foreign policy interest was influenced by the realization that the future of the fact of a structural and economic superiority of the German Empire was not to shake and that is why France would not only be able to get the new European order of peace maintained. This is followed by a French foreign policy was based, so that Briand wanted to solve the security problem with a negotiation policy aimed in whole on a "reconciliation with the former enemy" [9].
Aristide Briand
To his reign he tried to enforce its position, that this project will be a success only if the German Reich in terms of its concessions would be granted reparations. This was intended Briand strengthen the democratic and pacifist forces in the kingdom, which should guarantee him greater influence through the consolidation of peace.
Despite the target of his policy of rapprochement, which was classified consistently in the existing agreement, he arranged "under the national goal that reached after the war to preserve French power position and strengthen" its foreign policy agenda [10].
But Briand came under increasing domestic pressure, as he intended to give the German Government policy concessions in return for a German grant. "Given the extremely tight financial situation in France, he took greater reparations Germany by the mobilization of the Dawes bonds in exchange for the early evacuation of the Rhineland, the return of the Saar and the dismissal of the Inter-Allied Military Control Commission (IMKK) in the eye." [11] It is the early evacuation of the Rhineland had for Briand top priority because it is recognized the political key to a bilateral agreement and a general reconciliation. The resistors gegen seine Pläne kamen aus allen Richtungen: vom Militär, das zunächst die Ostgrenze befestigen wollte, vom Kabinett der "Nationalen Union", das eine verstärkte revisionistische Politik betrieb, vom französischen Abgeordnetenhaus und der Presse, die eine Räumung des Rheinlandes von neuen Sicherheitsgarantien abhängig machen wollten.
Ein von allen gefordertes "Ostlocarno" lehnte Briand ab, da es politisch und militärisch nicht durchzusetzen gewesen wäre. Dennoch war die Sicherheitsfrage für die Öffentlichkeit von zentraler Bedeutung, so dass nur derjenige politischen Rückhalt von ihr erwarten konnte, der zu ihrer Lösung annehmbare Fortschritte aufzeigte.
Vor diesem Hintergrund entstand der Briand-Kellogg-Pakt, der zunächst als bilaterales Sonderbündnis zwischen Frankreich und den USA in Form eines Kriegsächtungsvertrages angedacht war. Obwohl keine konkreten Hinweise in den Akten des französischen Außenministeriums zu finden sind, deutet der hinterbliebene Schriftverkehr zwischen Briand und seinem Amtskollegen Frank Kellogg darauf hin [12], dass Briand mit seiner Friedensinitiative "beabsichtigte, durch einen Zuwachs an Sicherheit die innenpolitische Opposition zu überwinden und die Fortführung der Verständigungspolitik zu ermöglichen" [13].
Despite the target of his policy of rapprochement, which was classified consistently in the existing agreement, he arranged "under the national goal that reached after the war to preserve French power position and strengthen" its foreign policy agenda [10].
But Briand came under increasing domestic pressure, as he intended to give the German Government policy concessions in return for a German grant. "Given the extremely tight financial situation in France, he took greater reparations Germany by the mobilization of the Dawes bonds in exchange for the early evacuation of the Rhineland, the return of the Saar and the dismissal of the Inter-Allied Military Control Commission (IMKK) in the eye." [11] It is the early evacuation of the Rhineland had for Briand top priority because it is recognized the political key to a bilateral agreement and a general reconciliation. The resistors gegen seine Pläne kamen aus allen Richtungen: vom Militär, das zunächst die Ostgrenze befestigen wollte, vom Kabinett der "Nationalen Union", das eine verstärkte revisionistische Politik betrieb, vom französischen Abgeordnetenhaus und der Presse, die eine Räumung des Rheinlandes von neuen Sicherheitsgarantien abhängig machen wollten.
Ein von allen gefordertes "Ostlocarno" lehnte Briand ab, da es politisch und militärisch nicht durchzusetzen gewesen wäre. Dennoch war die Sicherheitsfrage für die Öffentlichkeit von zentraler Bedeutung, so dass nur derjenige politischen Rückhalt von ihr erwarten konnte, der zu ihrer Lösung annehmbare Fortschritte aufzeigte.
Vor diesem Hintergrund entstand der Briand-Kellogg-Pakt, der zunächst als bilaterales Sonderbündnis zwischen Frankreich und den USA in Form eines Kriegsächtungsvertrages angedacht war. Obwohl keine konkreten Hinweise in den Akten des französischen Außenministeriums zu finden sind, deutet der hinterbliebene Schriftverkehr zwischen Briand und seinem Amtskollegen Frank Kellogg darauf hin [12], dass Briand mit seiner Friedensinitiative "beabsichtigte, durch einen Zuwachs an Sicherheit die innenpolitische Opposition zu überwinden und die Fortführung der Verständigungspolitik zu ermöglichen" [13].
Frank Billings Kellogg
Inhaltlich hätte dieser Vertrag, sofern er von beiden Staaten unterzeichnet worden wäre, "Frankreich in einem künftigen Konflikt die neutrale Haltung der USA" zugesichert und "auf diese Weise die machtpolitische Stellung Frankreichs im europäischen Nachkriegssystem" gestärkt. [14] Somit wären auch die französischen Machtpolitiker, die darauf bedacht waren, Frankreich wieder zu einer europäischen Größe aufzurichten, zufrieden gestellt worden.
Briands Plan setzte sich nicht durch. Statt dessen bevorzugten die USA ein multilaterales Abkommen, dass ihren nationalen Interessen besser entsprechen sollte. Ihnen ging es vielmehr um den Schutz ihrer ausgedehnten Handels- und Finanzbeziehungen in Europa, wobei militärische Verpflichtungen were excluded. Moreover, could such a contract, as he suggested U.S. Secretary of State to his colleagues, not to limit the agency of the State Department. Kellogg therefore rejected an unconditional ban on war and spoke out against further definitions, as they had requested the British and French governments on the importance of aggressive war. The focus of the contract should be based entirely on its moral effect. "After the U.S. was not willing to take in an agreement signed by them relating to international treaties to which they were not involved and for which no guarantee wanted to take over "[15]
The counter-proposal Kelloggs, which he initially the French foreign minister on April 13 1928 other great powers -. Great Britain, German Reich, Italy and Japan - had submitted were, except for minor text changes in the involved States adopted. At the instigation of the French and British government, the signatory group to the "small" Locarno Belgium, Poland and Czechoslovakia expanded and placed in the preamble to the principle of freedom of action against the defaulting States expressed ".
The international law in the literature called Kriegsächtungspakt Agreement was finally on 27 Signed August 1928 by 15 countries in Paris and entered into force a year later. The Preamble to the undersigned Contracting States - including the USSR, India and Ireland - this pact "in the conviction that the time has come for an open renunciation of war as an instrument of national policy utterance."
They solemnly declare in Article 1, "the war as a means of settling international disputes" to condemn and renounce "him as an instrument of national policy in their mutual relations". The Article 2 defines the promise that in the case of "disputes or conflicts that may arise between them, the nature or origin may be, not through peaceful means only "solutions or arrangements are to be found.
With this contract, which had taken unofficial successor of the failed Geneva Protocol of October 2, 1924, was the pre-existing partial ban on war - included in the prevention of war law of the Covenant - extended to a general ban on war
Unmistakable that illustrated the signatories of their political will, from now on the war as a means to achieve political objectives -.'s political jus ad bellum - outlaw and to peaceful methods of conflict resolution to .
put the euphoria, that prevailed after the signing of the Briand-Kellogg Pact of many opponents of the war and international law experts could not hide its shortcomings and ambiguities, the legal content and legal consequences of this contract relate. Consequently, it can be read from the contemporary literature of international law is no clear verdict on this agreement. Nevertheless, the lawyers were among agree "that the Kellogg Pact - in contrast to the League of Nations resolution in the fall of 1927 - representing a real contract, which imposed the signatories legal obligations and also because of a lack of termination clause of unlimited duration and thus" eternal was. "[16]
The Kellogg-Briand Pact was therefore valid even after the end of World War II, so that the allies it taken as a legal basis for the International Military Tribunal of the Major War Criminals. Strictly speaking was this contract one of the few legal sources, that established such a procedure is justified and the accused could be tried. The legal application to a real and unique case, and the weakness of this contract shows that had been spoken only in research papers.
The objections defense, presented by the international law Hermann Annual Travel reflect, in a sense, the state the legal interpretations against which they had found up to this point in the international legal literature. In the following aspects of the Briand-Kellogg Pact is questionable:
a) This contract is not clearly identifiable, to be ostracized by him whether general or limited war only in its form.
In the case of a condemnation of war, the war was generally outside the law and so would be a crime. A state where he is one of the signatories would lose, according to this view, his neutrality and martial law would be, under this multilateral agreement is no longer entitled to lead a war at all, let denn einen Krieg als Mittel zur Erreichung politischer Ziele anzuwenden. Außerdem hätte ein Vertragsmitglied staats- und verfassungsrechtliche Konsequenzen zu tragen, so daß die internationale Ächtung des Krieges gleichzeitig das nationale Recht und das Handeln der davon betroffenen Menschen mit einschließt.
Im Falle einer eingeschränkten Form des Krieges wäre das Kriegsrecht als solches betroffen, d. h. dem Staat würde das Kriegführen nur erlaubt sein, sofern ein vertragsbrüchiger Signatar ihn oder ein anderes Mitglied angreift und er sich deshalb allein oder kollektiv verteidigen resp. Beistand leisten muß. In diesem Sinne entspricht "die völkerrechtliche Selbstverteidigung der strafrechtlichen Notwehr, participation in sanctioning wars of the World Organization of the criminal emergency. "not [17]
Although this limitation of war law, a general condemnation of war must exclude [18], kept many lawyers - because the pact not a universal characteristic is inherent -" the laws of war also in case of breach of contract remains "[19] has to be valid.
b) The Kellogg-Briand Pact is no generally accepted definition of offensive and defensive war.
How Eva summarizes Buchheit, was this deficiency, especially in the contemporary German law literature in detail discussed: this is how international law Karl Strupp [20] auf die Gefahr hingewiesen, "die in dem freien Entscheidungsrecht des Staates über die Tatsache eines Angriffs und die Berechtigung einer Notwehr liege" [21]. Auch der Pazifist und Völkerrechtler Hans Wehberg "sah in dem Vorbehalt der legitimen Selbstverteidigung" [22] eine bedenkliche Vertragslücke [23]. Seiner Meinung nach könnte ein Mißbrauch verhindert werden, sofern man "die Entscheidung über das Vorliegen eines Angriffskrieges dem angegriffenen Staate" nimmt und sie "dem Völkerbundrat bzw. einer anderen internationalen Instanz" [24] überträgt [25].
Auch der österreichische Völkerrechtler Josef Kunz [26] "hielt das Fehlen einer rechtlichen Definition des Angreifers und an objective assessment procedure is appropriate to make the renunciation of war illusory. "[27]
The Hamburg lawyer Albrecht Mendelssohn-Bartholdy [28] and the Vienna international lawyer Alfred Verdross [29], however, were of the opinion that" the right of self defense by the Explanations Kelloggs to the case of a violent intrusion into their own territory was limited, making the breach of contract to one in the practice is clearly recognizable fact. "[30]
will finally belong to the vulnerability of the Kellogg Pact, lack of legal regulations, every signatory to compel compliance with the Treaty and as against the defaulting Intended to clarify legal and trial could be applied.
-------------------------------------
[1] Haffner, Sebastian, The final peace treaty, In: The Treaty of Versailles, Munich 1978, p. 425
Briands Plan setzte sich nicht durch. Statt dessen bevorzugten die USA ein multilaterales Abkommen, dass ihren nationalen Interessen besser entsprechen sollte. Ihnen ging es vielmehr um den Schutz ihrer ausgedehnten Handels- und Finanzbeziehungen in Europa, wobei militärische Verpflichtungen were excluded. Moreover, could such a contract, as he suggested U.S. Secretary of State to his colleagues, not to limit the agency of the State Department. Kellogg therefore rejected an unconditional ban on war and spoke out against further definitions, as they had requested the British and French governments on the importance of aggressive war. The focus of the contract should be based entirely on its moral effect. "After the U.S. was not willing to take in an agreement signed by them relating to international treaties to which they were not involved and for which no guarantee wanted to take over "[15]
The counter-proposal Kelloggs, which he initially the French foreign minister on April 13 1928 other great powers -. Great Britain, German Reich, Italy and Japan - had submitted were, except for minor text changes in the involved States adopted. At the instigation of the French and British government, the signatory group to the "small" Locarno Belgium, Poland and Czechoslovakia expanded and placed in the preamble to the principle of freedom of action against the defaulting States expressed ".
The international law in the literature called Kriegsächtungspakt Agreement was finally on 27 Signed August 1928 by 15 countries in Paris and entered into force a year later. The Preamble to the undersigned Contracting States - including the USSR, India and Ireland - this pact "in the conviction that the time has come for an open renunciation of war as an instrument of national policy utterance."
They solemnly declare in Article 1, "the war as a means of settling international disputes" to condemn and renounce "him as an instrument of national policy in their mutual relations". The Article 2 defines the promise that in the case of "disputes or conflicts that may arise between them, the nature or origin may be, not through peaceful means only "solutions or arrangements are to be found.
With this contract, which had taken unofficial successor of the failed Geneva Protocol of October 2, 1924, was the pre-existing partial ban on war - included in the prevention of war law of the Covenant - extended to a general ban on war
Unmistakable that illustrated the signatories of their political will, from now on the war as a means to achieve political objectives -.'s political jus ad bellum - outlaw and to peaceful methods of conflict resolution to .
put the euphoria, that prevailed after the signing of the Briand-Kellogg Pact of many opponents of the war and international law experts could not hide its shortcomings and ambiguities, the legal content and legal consequences of this contract relate. Consequently, it can be read from the contemporary literature of international law is no clear verdict on this agreement. Nevertheless, the lawyers were among agree "that the Kellogg Pact - in contrast to the League of Nations resolution in the fall of 1927 - representing a real contract, which imposed the signatories legal obligations and also because of a lack of termination clause of unlimited duration and thus" eternal was. "[16]
The Kellogg-Briand Pact was therefore valid even after the end of World War II, so that the allies it taken as a legal basis for the International Military Tribunal of the Major War Criminals. Strictly speaking was this contract one of the few legal sources, that established such a procedure is justified and the accused could be tried. The legal application to a real and unique case, and the weakness of this contract shows that had been spoken only in research papers.
The objections defense, presented by the international law Hermann Annual Travel reflect, in a sense, the state the legal interpretations against which they had found up to this point in the international legal literature. In the following aspects of the Briand-Kellogg Pact is questionable:
a) This contract is not clearly identifiable, to be ostracized by him whether general or limited war only in its form.
In the case of a condemnation of war, the war was generally outside the law and so would be a crime. A state where he is one of the signatories would lose, according to this view, his neutrality and martial law would be, under this multilateral agreement is no longer entitled to lead a war at all, let denn einen Krieg als Mittel zur Erreichung politischer Ziele anzuwenden. Außerdem hätte ein Vertragsmitglied staats- und verfassungsrechtliche Konsequenzen zu tragen, so daß die internationale Ächtung des Krieges gleichzeitig das nationale Recht und das Handeln der davon betroffenen Menschen mit einschließt.
Im Falle einer eingeschränkten Form des Krieges wäre das Kriegsrecht als solches betroffen, d. h. dem Staat würde das Kriegführen nur erlaubt sein, sofern ein vertragsbrüchiger Signatar ihn oder ein anderes Mitglied angreift und er sich deshalb allein oder kollektiv verteidigen resp. Beistand leisten muß. In diesem Sinne entspricht "die völkerrechtliche Selbstverteidigung der strafrechtlichen Notwehr, participation in sanctioning wars of the World Organization of the criminal emergency. "not [17]
Although this limitation of war law, a general condemnation of war must exclude [18], kept many lawyers - because the pact not a universal characteristic is inherent -" the laws of war also in case of breach of contract remains "[19] has to be valid.
b) The Kellogg-Briand Pact is no generally accepted definition of offensive and defensive war.
How Eva summarizes Buchheit, was this deficiency, especially in the contemporary German law literature in detail discussed: this is how international law Karl Strupp [20] auf die Gefahr hingewiesen, "die in dem freien Entscheidungsrecht des Staates über die Tatsache eines Angriffs und die Berechtigung einer Notwehr liege" [21]. Auch der Pazifist und Völkerrechtler Hans Wehberg "sah in dem Vorbehalt der legitimen Selbstverteidigung" [22] eine bedenkliche Vertragslücke [23]. Seiner Meinung nach könnte ein Mißbrauch verhindert werden, sofern man "die Entscheidung über das Vorliegen eines Angriffskrieges dem angegriffenen Staate" nimmt und sie "dem Völkerbundrat bzw. einer anderen internationalen Instanz" [24] überträgt [25].
Auch der österreichische Völkerrechtler Josef Kunz [26] "hielt das Fehlen einer rechtlichen Definition des Angreifers und an objective assessment procedure is appropriate to make the renunciation of war illusory. "[27]
The Hamburg lawyer Albrecht Mendelssohn-Bartholdy [28] and the Vienna international lawyer Alfred Verdross [29], however, were of the opinion that" the right of self defense by the Explanations Kelloggs to the case of a violent intrusion into their own territory was limited, making the breach of contract to one in the practice is clearly recognizable fact. "[30]
will finally belong to the vulnerability of the Kellogg Pact, lack of legal regulations, every signatory to compel compliance with the Treaty and as against the defaulting Intended to clarify legal and trial could be applied.
-------------------------------------
[1] Haffner, Sebastian, The final peace treaty, In: The Treaty of Versailles, Munich 1978, p. 425
[2] Ibid., P. 420
[3] Ibid., P. 419
[4] Ibid. [5] Ibid., P. 421
[6] Ibid., P. 422
[7] Ibid., P. 420
[8] Ibid.
[9] Buchheit, Eva, The Kellogg-Briand Pact 1928% u2013 power politics or peace effort?, Diss ad Phil. D. Fac Univ. Cologne, Münster 1998, p. 38
[10] Ibid., P. 39
[11] Ibid.
[12] See ibid., P. 381
[13] Ibid., P. 42
[14] Ibid., P. 382
[15] Ibid., P. 384
[16] Ibid, p. 358
[17] Kimminich, Otto / Hobe, Stephan, Introduction to International Law, 7 Edition, Tübingen / Basel 2000, p. 53
[18] See ibid.
[19] Buchheit, supra, p. 359
[20] See, Strupp, Karl, The Kellogg Pact in the context of war prevention law (= Frankfurt's essays on war prevention law 9), Leipzig 1928, p. 20ff.
[21] Buchheit, supra, p. 363
[22] Ibid.
[23] Wehberg, Hans, The main gap of the Kellogg Pact, In: The Friedenswarte 29 (August 1929), p. 225 - 228
[24] Wehberg, Hans, the outlawing of war, a lecture at the Hague Academy of International Law and at the Institut Universitaire des Hautes Etudes Internationales, Geneva (writings of the German League for the League of Nations) Berlin 1930, p. 132 and S. 133rd
[25] See Buchheit, supra, p. 363
[26] Kunz, Josef L., The Kellogg Pact, In: Communications of the German Society of International Law 9 (1929), p. 75 - 101
[27] Buchheit, supra, p. 363
[28] Mendelssohn-Bartholdy, Albrecht, The Kellogg Pact, In: Juristische Wochenschrift 57 (1928), p. 3081 - 3083rd
[29] Verdross, Alfred, The exceptions to the prohibitions of the war-Kellogg Pact, In: The Friedenswarte 30 (March 1930), p. 65 - 66
[30] Buchheit, supra, p. 363
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